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FCC-Constitutional Right To Free Speech-Limp Libidi-
nal Language-The timidity of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals was vividly displayed in Pacifica Foundation
v. FCC.' Squarely presented with the opportunity to become
the first court to define "indecent language," as it pertains to
the United States Criminal Code,2 the appellate court at-
tempted to avoid the challenge altogether. Rather than make
any determination on the issue of indecency, the court re-
treated to safer ground and produced a ruling based on a
nonexistent obscenity issue.
During the early afternoon hours of October 30, 1973,
WBAI-FM, a New York radio station licensed to Pacifica Foun-
dation, conducted a general discussion of the attitudes of con-
temporary society toward language. The discussion was part of
the station's regular programming. Toward the end of the pro-
gram, a selection was broadcast from the record album entitled
"George Carlin, Occupation: Foole." Before playing the record,
the WBAI commentator warned listeners that the recording
included language which might be regarded as offensive to
some. Those who were likely to be offended were advised to
change the station and return to it after fifteen minutes. The
album segment was a satirical comedy monologue, lasting
about twelve minutes, regarding the use of ten "words you
couldn't say on the public . ..airwaves," 3 words which de-
picted sexual or excretory organs and activities.4
On December 3, 1973, the Federal Communications Com-
mission received a complaint from a man who heard the broad-
cast while driving in his car with his young son. This was the
only complaint of record received by either the FCC or the
radio station.
Acting on this complaint, the FCC issued a declaratory
order5 in 1975 prohibiting the station from rebroadcasting'the
1. 556 F.2d 9 (D.D.C. 1977).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970).
3. 556 F.2d at 38 (Leventhal, J., dissenting and quoting from the monologue tran-
script, Appendix 1).
4. For the strong of heart, the original seven words (used in various contexts) can
be found in the Appendix to the opinion. Id. at 38-39.
5. 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
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monologue whenever children are likely to be part of the listen-
ing audience. The Commission determined that its power to
issue such an order derived chiefly from 18 U.S.C. section
1464, which provides that, "Whoever utters any obscene, in-
decent, or profane language by means of radio communications
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both."
Noting that there was authority supporting the proposition
"that the two terms ['obscene' and 'indecent'] refer to two
different things,"6 the FCC ruled that the material from the
record album was indecent as distinguished from obscene. This
distinction was made explicit in the text of the order. "This
order does not deal with the somewhat different problem of
'obscene' language."'
Although the United States Supreme Court has developed
standards for determining obscenity, no court has ever authori-
tatively defined indecency. The FCC, therefore, initially chose
to rely upon a definition which the Commission itself had of-
fered in Eastern Educational Radio,8 a ruling issued in 1970.
"[W]e believe that the statutory term, 'indecent,' should be
applicable, and that, in the broadcast field, the standard for
its applicability should be that the material broadcast is (a)
patently offensive by contemporary community standards; and
(b) is utterly without redeeming social value." 9 This definition
was linked to the then "existing Supreme Court obscenity stan-
dards announced in Memoirs v. Massachusetts."0
[I]t must be etablished that (a) the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in
sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the descrip-
tion or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material
is utterly without redeeming social value."
Thus, in 1970 the FCC decided that indecency could be
distinguished from obscenity on the sole basis that indecent
material need not appeal "to a prurient interest in sex."
6. Id. at 97.
7. Id. at 94-95.
8. 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970).
9. Id. at 412.
10. 383 U.S. 413 (1965).
11. Id. at 418.
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Since the Supreme Court revised its obscenity standards in
Miller v. California12 in 1973, the FCC felt compelled to refor-
mulate its own prior definition of indecency when issuing the
Pacifica order.
The Commission viewed the problem of indecency as if it
were a public nuisance. "Nuisance law generally speaks to
channeling behavior more than actually prohibiting it.' The
purpose of the order was to "channel" the broadcast of inde-
cent language in such a way as to assure that children do not
hear it.
Therefore, the concept of "indecent" is intimately connected
with the exposure of children to language that describes in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary com-
munity standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excre-
tory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is
a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience. 4
The Commission conceded that different standards could be
employed when the number of children in the audience is re-
duced to a minimum.
In comparison with the FCC's definition of indecency, the
current Supreme Court obscenity standards are enunciated in
Miller as follows:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards" would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, ...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 5
In its Pacifica Foundation order, the FCC expressed the
opinion that indecent language is distinguishable from obscene
language in only two respects. First, "it lacks the element of
appeal to the prurient interest, . . . and [secondly], when
children may be in the audience, it cannot be redeemed by a
claim that it has literary, artistic, political or scientific
value." 6
12. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
13. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. (Emphasis in the original).
14. Id.
15. 413 U.S. at 24.
16. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
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It should be noted that in his concurring opinion, Chief
Judge Bazelton detected an additional distinction not raised
by the FCC in its order. "[T]he Commission does not test the
'indecency' of speech under 'local community standards,' but
rather on the basis of what it terms 'contemporary community
standards for the broadcast industry'."' 7 Arguably at least, the
"broadcast medium" approach implies a national standard,
one which would be determined by nationwide members of the
radio industry. This would conflict with the "local community"
test which expressly endorses the use of local standards estab-
lished by "average" citizens.
Pacifica appealed from the FCC order to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. Its argument was "that section
1464 is unconstitutionally vague unless the term indecent is
subsumed by the term obscene as defined in Miller v.
California."' The appellant maintained that the monologue
could not be termed obscene since "it does not appeal to any
prurient interest and because it has literary and political
value." 9
At the very least, Pacifica argued, indecency "refers to ma-
terial which appeals to prurient interest as distinguished from
material which is merely coarse, rude, vulgar, profane or op-
probrious.""° Furthermore, Pacifica contended that the FCC
definition was "overbroad as it does not assure that programs
of serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value will be
allowed to air."'21
Undeniably, the issue raised on appeal was "indecency."
The FCC and Pacifica were in apparent agreement that the
broadcast material in question did not fall into the category of
"obscenity." The FCC's position was that indecency was some-
thing different than obscenity, and that the standards for de-
termining indecency were less stringent than those applicable
for obscenity. Pacifica insisted that indecency and obscenity
were, in effect, different names for the same concept.
Despite the clear-cut presentation of the indecency issue,
the court of appeals chose not to "resolve this difficult ques-
17. 556 F.2d at 22.
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 13.
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tion."22 "We do not find it necessary to determine whether the
term 'indecent' can be more narrowly defined than the term
'obscene'. '"3 The court felt it could base its ruling solely on 47
U.S.C. section 326, which prohibits the FCC from acting as a
censor or interfering "with the right of free speech by means
of radio communication. ' 24
According to the court, the purpose and effect of the FCC
order was "to inhibit the free and robust exchange of ideas on
a wide range of issues and subjects by means of radio and
television communication. 2  Therefore, the order was re-
versed. The FCC's public nuisance analogy and channeling
arguments were not accepted.
The Commission claims that its Order does not censor
indecent language but rather channels it to certain times of
the day. In fact the Order is censorship, regardless of what
the Commission chooses to call it. The intent of the Commis-
sion is clear. It is to keep language that describes sexual or
excretory organs and activities from the airwaves when there
is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience. 21
Unfortunately, the court neglected to provide the FCC with
any workable standards by which it might determine at what
point its duty to prohibit the broadcast of "obscene, indecent
or profane language" ends and where the impermissible activ-
ity of censorship begins. Taken by itself, the following defini-
tion, as offered by the court, is not very helpful: "Any examina-
tion of thought or expression in order to prevent publication of
objectionable material is censorship.' '27
Other language in the opinion, however, suggested that 47
U.S.C. section 326 is merely a statutory restatement of the
first amendment guarantee of free speech:
Under its mandate to promote the public interest, the Com-
mission may promulgate rules on a variety of matters, includ-
22. Id. at 15.
23. Id.
24. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) provides that:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the [Federal
Communications] Commission the power of censorship over the radio commu-
nications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condi-
tion shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with
the right of free speech by means of radio communication.
25. 556 F.2d at 13.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 14.
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ing broadcast programming. However, any such actions by
the Commission must be carefully tailored to meet the re-
quirements of the First Amendment, as Congress has explic-
itly mandated in section 326 of the Communications Act.28
How then, are "the requirements of the first amendment"
to be satisfied? The court first applied the Miller obscenity
standards to determine whether or not the first amendment
applied in this situation. The material was found to be nonob-
scene. "[T]hese words quite possibly could have literary, pol-
itical or artistic value. Therefore this nonobscene speech is en-
titled to First Amendment protections. ' 29 Thus, the court
which earlier had ignored the determinative issue of indecency,
raised an obscenity question which was never at issue.
Apparently then, all nonobscene material relating to sexual
matters falls under the protection of the first amendment. By
inference the court was stating that if indecent language could
be distinguished from obscene language, indecent language
would be protected by the constitutional guarantee of free
speech.
After determining that the first amendment was applicable
to the case, the court found that the FCC's action was uncon-
stitutional in the first instance. Furthermore, the order also
was found to be overbroad in that it failed to consider the
context in which the prohibited language was used, and vague
in that it failed to define with any precision what class of
"children" was to be protected by the prohibition.
Interestingly, in its discussion of overbreadth, the court
again reverted to an obscenity analysis. One of the grounds
upon which the FCC had distinguished its concept of indecency
from that of obscenity was that indecency could not "be re-
deemed by a claim that it has literary, artistic, political or
scientific value '3 3 whenever children were in the audience.
Whether language had such value was the third consideration
employed by the Miller obscenity standards.
Perhaps the most unsettling and confusing aspect of this
decision was that the court created grave doubt as to whether
the FCC had the power to prohibit or "regulate non-obscene
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id. at 16.
30. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
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speech ' 31 in any manner whatsoever. Since the order was found
to be both overbroad and vague anyway, the court felt it was
unnecessary to discuss the FCC's power. For the sole purpose
of determining these other issues, the majority opinion merely
assumed "arguendo" that the Commission could regulate such
speech.32 This approach could have the remarkable effect of
rewriting 18 U.S.C. section 1464 in such a way as to delete
"profane," as well as "indecent," language from the list of
prohibited radio broadcast material. If this were accomplished,
the appellate court would be justified in its refusal to discuss
indecency.
Ironically, the court quoted with approval the following lan-
guage from Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville:33 "Speech that
is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legis-
lative proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the
young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks un-
suitable for them." 4 The FCC never claimed that the mono-
logue was obscene, but based its order upon an interpretation
of "some other legislative proscription," namely, that against
indecency. Yet, without bothering to construe the meaning of
this pertinent "other legislative proscription," the court never-
theless found a first amendment violation.
Chief Judge Bazelton, who authored a concurring opinion,
also felt that the statutory ban on censorship as outlined in 47
U.S.C. section 326, was violated. However, he objected to the
majority's broad unlimited interpretation of this statute.
"Althought the language of section 326 is very broad, the
scope of that section is apparently limited by 18 U.S.C. section
1464 and 47 U.S.C. section 503(b)(1). 35 .
In order to determine whether or not nonobscene speech
may be regulated, Chief Judge Bazelton suggested a two-step
process. First, it must be determined whether such speech
would be protected by the first amendment in other media. If
so, the second step would require an analysis of the unique
character of broadcasting in order to discover whether it could
31. 556 F.2d at 18.
32. Id. at 16 and 18.
33. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
34. 556 F.2d at 16, quoting 422 U.S. at 213-14. (Emphasis added).
35. 556 F.2d at 20. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970) provides for criminal punishments on
those who utter "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio." 47
U.S.C. §1503(b)(1) (1970) provides that the Federal Communications Commission has
the power to impose forfeitures on licensees who violate 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
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somehow justify an expanded regulation of speech. After deter-
mining that the monologue generally would be constitutionally
protected in other media, Chief Judge Bazelton could find no
rational basis for denying this protection to the broadcast me-
dium.
Written by Judge Leventhal, the dissent adopted an ap-
proach to this case which in its own way was every bit as
bizarre as the majority's decision. While acknowledging the
distinction between indecency and obscenity offered by the
FCC, the dissent found that it was inconsequential. "In the last
analysis, the FCC's opinion on what is 'indecent' stands as a
functional equivalent to the Supreme Court's current
'obscenity' ruling (Miller), save for an adaptation to bridge the
difference posed by the characteristic of radio presentation."36
In other words, the FCC was mistaken in attempting to
distinguish between the two terms. In this respect, the dissent
accepted the position urged by Pacifica. However, Judge Lev-
enthal then found that the monologue was obscene, a position
taken by neither party.
The "adaptation" of the obscenity standards was required
in this case because of the broadcast industry's "special access
to the home. ' 3 According to Judge Leventhal, families should
have the right to decide whether or not to protect their children
from hearing "special vocabularies appropriate only for special
groups, times and places. ' ' 38 Furthermore, families should be
permitted to exercise this right free from any outside interfer-
ence. "With the pervasiveness of TV-radio and its reach into
the home the choice made by broadcasters precludes an effec-
tive choice by the family. ' 39
Although the dissenting opinion determined that the mate-
rial was obscene, it did not reach this conclusion by a conven-
tional application of the Miller test:
Under Miller matter is not "obscene" if it has literary,
educational, artistic, political or scientific value, and accord-
ingly is not "indecent" (under a Miller-analogue test) if it has
such value. But the fact that it has such value for adults does
not mean that it has such value in a broadcast geared to
36. 556 F, 2d at 32.





children - or in a broadcast where a substantial number of
children are likely to be in the audience without parental
supervision."'
In effect, the dissent endorsed the concept of "variable ob-
scenity." In Ginsberg v. New York" the United States Supreme
Court had ruled that "the concept of obscenity. . . may vary
according to the group to whom the questionable material is
directed or from whom it is guaranteed. 42 However, as the
concurring opinion in Pacifica pointed out, "variable obscen-
ity" must also be subject to the Miller approach. The dissent
failed to determine that the monologue appealed to the pru-
rient interests of children or that it was without serious value
to them. It merely stated that different subjective standards
apply for children. It failed to state specifically how these stan-
dards differ in this case or how they apply within the Miller
analaysis.
The effect of Pacifica Foundation v. FCC was to eliminate
the statutory term "indecent" from 18 U.S.C. section 1464.
Faced with an FCC order prohibiting the broadcast of alleged
"indecent" language, the court held that this material could
not be banned since it was not obscene. The broadcast of non-
obscene matter was held to be protected by the first amend-
ment. Furthermore, the FCC may be without the power to
regulate nonobscene language in any manner. Therefore, the
court reasoned that the issue regarding the definition of inde-
cency was moot.
The most troublesome aspect of Pacifica was that the above
results were arrived at inferentially. The court refused to deal
directly with the indecency issue. Only the dissent attempted
to construe this term, and ironically, the same conclusion was
reached. Indecency was merely another name for obscenity.
Adding to the confusion was the court's inability to decide
whether the FCC was vested with the authority to regulate
broadcast material which was not obscene. The tone of the
opinion suggested that the FCC might not have such authority.
On January 10, 1978, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the court of appeals ruling.4 3 It
40. Id. at 36.
41. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
42. Id. at 636.
43. 46 U.S.L.W. 3426 (Jan. 10, 1978).
[Vol. 61:534
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remains to be seen if an authoritative definition of indecency
will be forthcoming, or if the FCC may properly regulate non
obscene material.
THOMAS E. DUGAN

